

*Home I'll never be:
Heideggerian Psychology for Better to be Nice, Okay?*

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So the doves cooed softly to each other, whispering of their own events, over Janey's grave in the grey Saba Pacha cemetary in Luvor.

Soon many other Janeys were born and these Janeys covered the Earth.

Blood and guts in high school

This is all I know

Parents teachers boyfriends

All have got to go.

Some folks like trains,

some folks like ships,

I like the way you move your hips

All I want is a taste of your lips,

boy,

All I want is a tatse of your lips (Acker 165).

§1 – Revelation of the Project as Such

“Human beings fuck up their lives because they are going to die and because they want to fuck.” -Dr. Robert Nicholls

Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* disclosed itself to me against a background of serious assumptions about the author, specifically his involvement with the Nazi party; these assumptions caused me to want to put the book down before even opening it. Nevertheless, Heidegger's work illuminated the world to me in such strange colours as it proceeded through its ouroboric hermeneutic exposition of the human condition that it warrants more credence and credibility than it is normally given, even given the author's history. Indeed, Heidegger's philosophical project in this book, despite its near hundred year old vintage, remains distinguished by its radicalism, both philosophically and linguistically – stepping off at the level of a fundamental ontology – and attempting to lay bare the structures of the being we are all ourselves. The book touches on many aspects of philosophy, however, as a reader with a personal interest in the psychology of anxiety, a certain facet stands out to me in particular. If we are to approach the work with a lens of psychoanalysis, the text *challenges us to face our own anxieties, and ask ourselves what we want to be given the fact that we are going to die one day. It also calls us to reveal a type of joy we typically mask from ourselves because we are afraid of temporality, death, and the ontological emptiness of the world.* The text also suggests that individuals in society predominantly run away from the option of choosing the world and themselves, therefore avoiding anxiety about death, but in doing so miss a particular type of

existential joy in choice and responsibility, and end up living the grey lives of *das Man*. In this vein, despite its monumental ontological claims, Heidegger's work contains within it the groundwork for a type of psychology that calls us to joy in the face of our deaths, a type of human psychotherapy that requires us to recognize temporality, mortality, and to challenge ourselves, and pick our heroes, in order to continue living with in joy against a grey uncanny groundless world in which we are not at home. By employing the lens of existential thinker and psychoanalyst, and focusing on Heidegger's existential analysis of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*, specifically his notions of joy, anxiety and the other, I hope to disclose the fact that Heidegger's work outlines a recipe for the care of the self, a recipe that does violence to the ordinary ways we coercive of individual confronting the world.

§2 – The Cast

Before one can proceed to understand the notion of Heideggerian care of self as I wish to depict it, one must examine how the structural elements of Heidegger's work interplay from the viewpoint of existential analysis. I hereby go on a brief description of the work's "protagonist" and its environment with no claim to a totalizing or complete depiction of either.

Subdivision A-1 – Dasein and Ecstatic Temporality

Heidegger's work has a span and breadth that make it very difficult to concisely explain in its totality, and the work can be, and has been, read in several different ways. Nevertheless, one can get a grip on a pragmatic use of Heidegger's existential analysis of the human condition and thereby the notion of Heideggerian care of self through the investigation of *Dasein*. *Dasein*, the *philosophical protagonist of Being and Time*, which can be loosely translated as 'there-being', is neither a tool nor a thing. It is rather something which calls its own being into question – which asks itself to what ends and why it exists, and in so doing must confront the reality of its temporality toward inevitable death.

An existential psychoanalytical reading of Heidegger must further analyze that *Dasein* is essentially care, or a concern for the future, this is both in regards to its own journey towards death and its relations to others. In this regard, as care, *Dasein* is always *ahead of itself* (Heidegger 386), meaning that *Dasein* projects itself ahead of itself and is based futurally. However, this futural propensity of *Dasein* is based on what Heidegger calls *ecstatic temporality*, a condition which necessarily constitutes *Dasein*. As *Dasein*, we exist and understand in and through *ecstatic temporality*; we simultaneously inhabit the three ecstasies of time – the past,

present, and future. This temporality is what Heidegger calls the “primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself” of Dasein, claiming further that “we therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the 'ecstasies' of temporality” (377) As Dasein, the self is radically temporized. This xenoself is its own past, present, and *future* – it both project forward and inherits; always outside of the present moment, and can take this projection and remembrance as far as its birth, its death, and the in-between. In the framework of existential psychotherapy, this type of temporality is key to understanding the care of self, as the meaning of the being of that we all are is conditioned by our temporal understanding of self – and it is through this meaning that we necessarily understand ourselves (Heidegger 38-39). As Dasein, we have a future and past that cuts into the way our lives operate presently, we both attempt to make our futural projections reality, and bring them closer, while at the same time planning, saving, storing, etc. We exist our possibilities in the present, yet we also exist our past, which comes towards us from the future, as a possibility, through understanding. The crux of a psychoanalytical read of Heidegger hinges on this ecstatic temporality, as it is Dasein's ability to transcends itself and its always outside of itself-ness, its projecting itself and looping back into itself, allows for choice.

Subdivision A-2 – Dasein and Choice

From an existential standpoint, the mental confrontation with its own inevitable death leads Dasein to develop its own unique understanding of itself and its being-towards-death as a destiny. Nevertheless, Dasein is typically opaque to itself and this unique understanding of its own potentialities; it is blocked off from itself and its ontic existence as being-towards-death, and this is concealed because Dasein is immersed in the meaning of the world given by its society from birth. In this immersion in the normative social *modus operandi*, Dasein misunderstands itself and treats itself as an object with a prefabricated purpose – instantaneously alienating itself from itself. From the standpoint of existentiality, in this opacity, Dasein cannot properly disclose itself as a temporalized being-towards-death with a unique understanding of how to live itself out. Nevertheless, the question 'what does it mean to be' is disclosed as a facet of Dasein's fundamental being as Dasein is called to confront this question by its own coconscious. This remains a question which Dasein must want to hear, but this process wrenches Dasein out of its immersion in the world and forces it to confront itself, the ontological obliteration of its understanding, and the fundamental lack of metaphysical absolutism in the world. This process,

where-in the meaning of its being is called into question, causes Dasein to find itself thrown in the midst of the world; with no reason to be, no cause, no ground, nor basis, nor reason. Dasein finds itself with no absolute foundation to existence, no absolutist answer the question ‘what does it mean for me to be’, and the question ‘what are the things *for*’. It is here that some existential choice is revealed, as Dasein is given the opportunity to become its own foundations or flee back to its bread understanding of the universal other, or the social understanding. We can see this process emerge on page 321 Being and Time when Heidegger references the condition of Dasein:

*That it is factically, may be obscure and hidden as regards the “why” of it; but the 'that-it-is' has itself been disclosed to Dasein. The thrownness of this entity belongs to the disclosedness of the 'there' and reveals itself constantly in its current mood. This mood brings Dasein, more or less explicitly and authentically, face to face with the fact 'that it is and that it has to be something with a potentiality-for-being as the entity which it is'. For the most part however, its mood is such that its thrownness gets *closed off*. In the face of its thrownness Dasein flees to the relief which comes with the supposed freedom of *das Man*. This fleeing has been described as a fleeing in the face of the uncanniness which is basically determinative for individualized Being-in-the-world. Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the basic mood of anxiety; and, as the most elemental way in which thrown Dasein is disclosed, it puts Dasein's Being-in-the-world face to face with the “nothing” of the world; in the face of this “nothing”, Dasein is anxious with anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-being (321).*

From a psychoanalytical level, this passage illuminates the choice by which we can take hold of the world; where we have the *potentiality* to define the value and meaning of all that surrounds us. However, the confrontation with this ownmost-potentiality-for-being causes anxiety, which necessary places Dasein in a double bind situation where it must either choose to inhabit a strange world in which it does not know its way about, or flee from the question of its existence. Bearing in mind the lens of existential psychoanalysis, every Dasein has its own existentiell individualized proclivities and plans that are revealed in anxiety when confronting its own eventual obliteration. However, due to the burdensome nature of answering the question of being, predominately, Dasein masks its own understandings of itself, and flees from itself out of fear of its inevitable death and the ontological shattering of the world in anxiety that that is disclosed alongside this. Nevertheless, every Dasein must die, *and no one else can live one's death for them*. At the end of the journey of the self is a death which is our ownmost possibility, a possibility that cannot be outlived (Heidegger 294), a possibility that is inevitable. This death prevents our ability to destine – and can happen at anytime – which further feeds into anxiety

and the burden one must live with. This death is always with us, face to face. Thus, as Dasein, we can chose to be responsible for our lives on our way towards death, but it is this life is full of fatigue, it is heavy and existence becomes burdensome.

Subdivision A3 – The Ontic Structures of Dasein

One can at this point grasp that one the key fundamental existential structures of Dasein as its ability to set a plan for itself from its birth to its death according to its own understanding – to set a resolution in anticipation, a concept which we will discuss later. This process allows Dasein to edit the metaphysical meaning of the world it inhabits, and to this end, allows it to project a plan as far as death, giving the world ontological meaning as far as one can possibly understand. However, one only has the ability to make this choice when one asks 'what does it mean for me to be?' and in answering this question in the face of their own death and anxiety. If one never does this because they search tranquility, they forfeit their ability to construct themselves and remain in the prefabricated world of the other, into which they are thrown from birth. Ultimately, questioning of one's existential "why" discloses one's condition as thrown being-in-the-world-towards-death – *all roads of why lead to death – born to die. The mood of this being-towards-death is always anxiety – a type of primordial not-at-homeness* (Heidegger 234). This is reinforced by Heideggers statement that anxiety "arises out of Being-in-the-world as thrown Being-towards-death" (395). As we mentioned before, the disclosedness of being-towards-death both reveals that one has to live a life that will eventually amount to death, which puts the world out of place, and that one can choose to live oneself out how they choose. This choice further individuates the world, despite the fact that our impending death shatters all our projects, goals and dreams. In an anxious world stripped of its meaning and purpose, Dasein ultimately must answer an ultimatum wherein it choose to run away and flee from the question of its existence or live itself out to its own choosing. The core psychoanalytic point being that if it flees, it *fucks up* its life, and misses joy in its fear of death and the emptiness of the world.

Subdivision B-1 – Lostness in Das Man

As mentioned before, against its own *unique* understanding of it it's potentialities, for the most part, Dasein is lost in a 'public way of acting'; a public *modus operandi*. This condition, which Heidegger calls the modality of *Das Man*, is such that "everyone is the other, and no one is themselves" (Heidegger 165). This modality is conditioned into us from birth, and is reinforced when one runs from the aforementioned question of the meaning of one's being and

back to the understanding that one is raised in. This type of prefabricated understanding which masks one's ownmost self, and substitutes one's ownmost potentialities for a set of rules that are equal parts alien and anxiety reducing. Heidegger to inferences that

With Dasein's lostness in [“*das Man*”], that factual potentiality-for-Being which is closest to it (the tasks, rules, and standards, the urgency and extent of concerned, and solicitous Being-in-the-world) has already been decided upon. [*Das Man*] has always kept Dasein from taking hold of these possibilities (312).

*In essence, when are lost in everyday understanding, the understanding of *Das Man*, we mask what we truly are, and hide our being-towards-death. When given the opportunity to question itself, Dasein can break this stranglehold, but at the cost of extreme anxiety and an uncanny element to one's existence. From the psychoanalytical level, the inauthentic understanding of self causes us to fail to be able to find ourselves, and conditions all of the ways we are to act, to work, and to deal with others. In its lostness in *das Man*, Dasein loses itself in a given anonymity – when we act as “Man” we become dominated in our possibilities and understanding and can only act as “Man”, or the generalized other. This domination stifles one's own potentialities, and prevents one from being able to define objects ontologically and metaphysically as one wishes*

As with other existential processes, our lostness in *das Man* occurs as a temporal process of action, understanding, and projection. We act as *das Man* when we analyze how others act and try to become more like them, when we ape them and imitate them. Heidegger describes this process on page 164 of *Being and Time* as follows:

In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of [*das Man*] is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as [*das Man*] takes pleasure; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as [*das Man*] shrinks back; we find 'shocking' what [*das Man*] finds shocking. [*das Man*], which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness.

The above outlined everyday depiction of existence is one in which our relationship to the world consists of an absorption that prevents us from distancing ourselves from others. In this state, one attempts to adopt their abstraction of the *Weltanschauung* of *das Man*. As this inauthentic being, one is trying to *be* others, who all seem comfortable in their journey towards death. As *das Man*, we plod along proposing that 'everyone else does it everyday'. It is in this everydayness that we are not our ownmost self, because we define ourselves relative to the world and others, and we

try to act like them because we want to hide our own death as they do. Indeed, when we think about ourselves we first define ourselves as the other - 'I am one among many', 'I am just acting as they do'. Focusing on existential psychoanalysis, we must hone in on this premise that the "care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of *Dasein* we call the 'levelling down' of all possibilities of being" (165). The importance being that this is essentially a process in which *Dasein* grounds itself on a supposition of what an idealized other should do – one wants to become a person like other people, because other people are seemingly at-home, they are seemingly doing fine and we must act like them in public to operate socially. Heidegger notes that

'Everdayness' means the 'how' in accordance with which *Dasein* 'lives day unto the day', whether in all its ways of behaving or only in certain ones which have been prescribed by Being-with-one-another. To this 'how' there belongs further the comfortableness of the accustomed, even if it forces one to do something burdensome and 'repugnant'. That which will come tomorrow (and this is what everyday concern keeps awaiting) is 'eternally yesterday's. In everydayness everything is all one and the same, but whatever the day may bring is taken as a diversification [...] Everdayness is a way *to be* – to which, of course, that which is publicly manifested belongs (422).

In essence, as *das Man*, we act publicly, a type of publicness which can tinge every aspect of our being. We ride the bus as anyone else, we think about death as anyone else, we defecate in the toilet as anyone else, we do not fart in public as anyone else, we do not eat our own excrement inside the police station high on an extremely volatile concoction of heroin and 'bath salts' as anyone else. Ultimately, *Das Man* blocks off death and anxiety while costing us our ability to be authentic and understand the world as we wish and dream. Whenever we act as we think others want us to act, we act as *das Man*, and we do this most when we believe we must act publicly. In doing so, we fundamentally delude ourselves and believe that we will not die our own death, focusing on the present moment and becoming comfortable in the process which ignores the temporal nature of our existence.

Subdivision B-2 – Das Man as the Removal of the Burden of Anxiety

Ultimately, the modality of *Das Man* removes the burdensome character of life – that is, that one must become the ground of one's existence, and prevents the levels of anxiety that come with authenticity. Indeed, Heidegger speculates that

Dasein in its everydayness is disburdened by [*das Man*]. Not only that; by thus disburdening it of its Being, [*das Man*] accommodates *Dasein* if *Dasein* has any tendency to take things easily and make them easy. And because [*das Man*] constantly

accommodates the particular *Dasein* by disburdening it of its Being, [*das Man*] retains and enhances its stubborn domination (165).

In this unburdened way we cease to be integral to ourselves, and cannot become our own selves; out of fear of facing our own death, we disintegrate and we distract ourselves from ourselves. This process is self-reinforcing insofar as the further we take on airs of publicness and attempt to act publicly like everyone else. In this state of existence, we engage in idle talk (Heidegger 212) and hold conversations that gloss over things; we gossip, and yet never actually talk about anything in the sense of disclosure. We talk about things superficially, never attempting to reveal anything. We engage in discourse in ambiguity (Heidegger 217); everything appears both good and bad. We further become curious about the world (Heidegger 216) – as *das Man* we always want to see and find out about the newest thing, but this is a knowing in order to immediately forget. These facets of the modality of *Das Man* are exceptionally relevant in industrial capitalism, as industry grinds on and ever churns out new objects for our fascination, and the media and internet super-corporations provide us ever new information that we instantly bury. The macro-micro system itself reinforces the stranglehold of otherness. The self reinforcing loop of dominating tranquilization is further enforced through a process Heidegger calls distentiality, wherein *Dasein* notices its difference from others and attempts to become more like them to further tranquilize itself (164). With the constant reassurance that 'Dasein will die but...', this everyday type of being has the basic purpose of leveling down *Dasein*'s possibilities and preventing it from actualizing its own unique understanding of the world in favour of fleeing the uncanny mood of anxiety in being-towards-death.

The impact of *Das Man* on psychology lies in the fact that we also miss out on a type of joy in becoming the other. We miss this joy because we become focused on making-now, on making present, on giving precedent in curiosity to the new which is actually a regurgitation of what has come before. Our future becomes nullified. Thus the existential psychoanalytical implications of *Dasein* becoming other reveals that the inauthentic life of *das Man* jettisons the ecstatic past and doesn't care about the ecstatic future. It "projects itself upon that with which one can concern oneself, or upon what is feasible, urgent, or indispensable in our everyday business" (Heidegger 386). One does not look at life as a great adventure that one can set up and engage with, one instead sits in awaiting, turned towards the future in the context of pragmatic activity, allowing the future to overwhelm at best, and comfort as a non-possibility at worst.

Sitting in mute curiosity, ignorant of ones own death, living life as a pathetic, patronizing, narrow-sighted vegetable, one is restricted to presentism and inauthenticity – which creates a self-replicating historical blindness as one looks for the new to make it now.

To conclude, an existential psychoanalytical reading of *Being and Time* postulates this existential sketch of inauthentic Dasein as *Das Man* includes “temptation, alienation, [and] self-entanglement [in the present] – [which prevents us from the] making-now which leaps away [that] has an ecstastical tendency such that it seeks to temporalize itself out of itself” (399). Ultimately, this condition in which we attempt to remain opaque to ourselves, dissuading ourselves that we have the opportunity to choose our own lives, *fucks up* our opportunity to live joyfully. This *fucking* is such that the tranquilization becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and makes Dasein no longer want to choose itself the longer its entanglement goes on. As inauthentic, Dasein becomes so obsessed with making newness now that it is no longer plans itself but remains another entity waiting on the next thing in docile nihilism.

§3 - Joy and Heideggerian Care of the Self

Subdivision A – The Call, Resolutions and the Ability to Wholly Choose Oneself

As Dasein, proximally and for the most part, covers itself up and ignores itself, running into the tranquillity of *das Man* because of the anxiety of having to face its own death and having to become the ground of its existence, it appears as if there is no hope of return from the dulling tranquil smothering of *das Man*. Nevertheless, Heidegger proposes that Dasein calls out to itself.

Dasein, as a being-with which understands, can *listen* to Others. Losing itself in the publicness and idle talk of the “they”, it *fails to hear* its own Self in listening to [*das Man*]. [...] If in this lost hearing, one has been fascinated with the 'hubub' of the manifold ambiguity which idle talk posses in its everyday 'newness'. Then the call must do its calling without any hubub and unambiguously, leaving no foothold for curiosity (315-316).

An existential psychoanalytical reading of *Being and Time* discloses that even when we try to cover it up, the self in anxiety calls to us without words. Even when smothered, our own essence cries out to our self and reveals the fact that we are to die against the groundless emptiness of the world. To itself, Dasein screams 'here you stand – now choose', and this hand of choice is frequently forced by trauma, violence, and other earthquakes of existence, which amplify anxiety. When Dasein calls to itself, it calls itself guilty of not giving the world its ownmost meaning. An existential psychoanalyst can thus point to the fact that Heidegger defines this being guilty as a “Being-the-ground-for a Being which has been defined by a 'not' – that is to say,

'being-the-basis of an emptiness'" (329), or in other words, that Dasein has defined itself as an essence that it has no access to – the essence of the other. Nevertheless, the call draws Dasein out of what it is immersed in and beckons it towards the possibility of an authentic self – of giving the world its own understanding. The call of conscience thus calls us away from *the they* and orders to take over being the ground of our existence and fill in the ontologic and metaphysical blanks that emerge in anxiety – to provide our own understanding and worldview. The call reveals that everything is in vain and empty; but more specifically that the understanding of *das man* makes everything vanity, makes the meaning of everything miss an authentic understanding of our own individualized worldviews.

Yet, to understand the appeal of conscience and this call, we must make a decision. We must *want to have a conscience* to be drawn out of the *they*; this wanting to-have a conscience is a readiness for anxiety, uncanniness and not-at-homeness (Heidegger 342). This is a type of wanting to hear oneself cry to oneself disclosively. Heidegger states that "hearing constitutes the primary authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-being – as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it" (206). Therefore, to act authentically, one must be open to the voice that doesn't speak, but perhaps screams, and thereby discloses the emptiness of the world. *Screaming* as a friend trying to help us.¹

From the standpoint of psychoanalysis, against the ontological nullity of the other, we are all fundamentally capable of a type of resoluteness, or a setting of a type of ground for ourselves, this requires the cultivation of a type of resolution in an inward passion. As resolute, we project as much of our own understanding of the world forward so that we can reinterpret things in the same way again and continue our plans and projects. Resoluteness is a type of becoming the ground of existence while recognizing death. Heidegger writes that

Resoluteness constitutes the *loyalty* of existence to its own Self. As resoluteness which is ready for *anxiety*, this loyalty is at the same time a possible way of revering the sole authority which a free existing can have – of revering the repeatable possibilities of existence (423).

In essence, as resolute, one situates one's identity into their choices and actions and tests themselves against the world – as resolute one sets their resolution against the world – one says 'I will not compromise on this' – one gives a sovereign 'yes'. This resoluteness constitutes a loyalty

¹ Editor's note – reference Land and human beings as the universe conscious of itself, screaming as it is has rend itself from itself.

to oneself where-in one always hands oneself down to oneself and lays tracks for oneself ahead of oneself, always in this mood of anxiety, but in this way Dasein individuates itself and can become a destiny, a destination, situated. These resolute projection are birthed in a moment of vision, the state in which one is revealed to oneself as if one's entire life is sitting before one's eyes (Heidegger 437). Heidegger in turn proposes "the situation is the 'there' which is disclosed in resoluteness – the 'there' as which the existent entity is there" (346). By choosing our resolution, and forcing ourselves to feel not at home, and forcing ourselves to face our own mortality and anxiety, one can become a destiny. In these moments we are carried away in a type of understanding that forms a clear grasp of who we are in the situation we find ourselves.

Indeed, only against the face of death, in resolute anxiety, can Dasein understand itself in terms of its ownmost existence – and only here can it choose to be itself and accept its inevitable death or not itself, to be authentic or inauthentic. Our own self stands as a possibility, a way in between birth and death. To recourse to the introduction of the book, where Heidegger theorizes that,

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whither it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. The question of existence never gets straightened out except by existing itself (33).

Dasein can either live to its own understanding and travel through a foreign world of its own understanding or become lost and can forfeit its way – losing its freedom. To seek authenticity is a type of quest after self-hood – it is standing up for oneself and realizing what one is, it is realizing that one will die and dealing with this situation and knowing that despite all of its effort, **Dasein ends for the most part unfulfilled, broken, and inauthentic.** Heidegger existentially characterizes authentic, whole Dasein, or Being-towards-death, as follows

anticipation [of death] reveals to Dasein its lostness in das Man, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death – a freedom which has been released of the Illusions of das Man, and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious (311).

As authentic, we recognize that we will die one day in a type of anticipatory translucency to our own ecstatic future. Actor, decision, and action are tied together against this future and we become the ground of our existence. We set resolutions which often fall to piece or are shattered as nothing can guarantee them in the face of death, and we thus remain a groundless ground,

forever in anxiety. The authentic resolve in the face of our own obliteration is a type of choosing-to-choose, and anticipatory resoluteness occurs when one projects their death and lays out their entire life path ahead of themselves. In this state one is continuous, one has continuity; yet at the same time resoluteness doesn't guarantee that we will hold the same choice – it does not dwell on a fixed position; *in resoluteness one holds the resolution open and free because one forces oneself into individuating anxiety constantly.*

In sum, authenticity sits as an existentiell modification of *das Man – a living to one's own understanding in one's own way in the face of death and the pressure of the other*. Of course when one acts like themselves one feels not at home, a stranger in a strange land, but this is the only way in which one can actualize themselves and not *fuck up* their own life. When one conceives of their existence in the ecstatic sense of a wholeness and totality, and attempts to conceive of the completion of one's own existence to their own plan, they can become a piper leading the rats of self as they command. This is to say, only when Dasein is in relationship to death as authentic, can one attempts to live with their own death, their own truth, their own morality and their own conscience. In authenticity we face death and become the ground of our existence, we set the terms of our life – which stands objectively contradictory to the inauthenticity in which we flee from being the ground of our existence. The key implication on psychology is that authentically understanding involves the anticipation of death and that this being-the-ground-of-our-existence brings us joy, despite the fact that inauthenticity and death constantly pull us in and fracture us and our resolve.

Subdivision B – The Heideggerian Care of Self

When we find ourselves thrown in anxiety, we can choose ourselves and be authentic, laying out our entire life plan or run away from the choice into social norms. We can seize the joy in creating ourselves or remain anxious or abandon it. In an existential psychoanalytical sense, what are the implications of this choice? If one confronts death authentically, it means watching all that one cares about crash into dust and nothingness as everything is swept away in the swelling flux of existence. It seems foolish to live an authentic existence and to participate in the struggle that is the *justice of existence*; it is difficult to not *flee* from the joy of creating oneself and to *fuck everything up*, to making oneself a robot. It takes a tremendous self possession to live joyfully in the actualization of oneself under constant anxiety. Why should one face death and say 'I take responsibility for the void of the world in a resolution', becoming the

ground of existence and generating the world's ontological meaning for oneself. Why should one not shrink back into the rationalization of *das Man*?

It is important to note that Heidegger mentions only joy (freude) twice. The key being that is *only* in authenticity that one can take delight over oneself, over living oneself out for oneself. As mentioned before, this a joy that those living the grey lives of *das Man* mask from themselves and cannot access. Heidegger depicts joy as a by-product of confronting the world honestly, a very difficult thing to do, and proposes that

anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the 'overcoming' of death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees death for the possibility of acquiring *power* over Dasein's *existence* and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments. Nor does wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which has been made determinative as Being-towards-death, signify a kind of seclusion in which one flees the world; rather, it brings one without Illusions into the resoluteness of 'taking action'. Neither does anticipatory resolution stem from 'idealistic' exaction soaring above existence and its possibilities; it springs from a sober understanding of what are factually the basic possibilities for Dasein. Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-being, **there goes an unshakeable joy in this possibility.** In it Dasein becomes free from the entertaining 'incidentals' with which busy curiosity keeps providing itself – primarily from the events of the world (358).

In authentic anticipatory resoluteness, we use death and anxiety as a tool to show the beautiful brevity of life, and to take control over ourselves, actualizing ourselves in its face, we cease to become distracted by the shallow pedantic entertainments of *das Man* and instead live our lives become joyful in living existence to our own understanding. There is a particular type of joy in creating oneself and attempting to live this creation – this almost appears as some type of *joie de vivre – a reason to be and continue to be.*

In sum, a friend is calling you to joy over yourself, and that friend is you yourself. The friend is saying 'come to yourself – *the choice* – nihilism or destiny; does one set their goals and attempt to go after them or does one place their faith in the eternal nothingness of supposition. From a psychoanalytical perspective, we all have a type of competence in managing our own being and we are all capable of understanding ourselves. We are all capable of taking joy over attempting to be ourselves against the bleak background of death. The essence of the existential psychoanalytical Heideggerian notion of the care of self lies herein – in order to maintain one's joy, one must confront anxiety and death head-on constantly. One must chose for themselves and give themselves a ground in the emptiness of life, one must find the joy that makes one wish to

live out life and not commit suicide under anxiety. As Dasein's condition remains factically towards death, it must be us that must give a ground to a nothing, an obliteration, and yet, there is a special joy in exercising the sovereign right of giving birth to a destiny, and of picking one's hero; to be able to give and take at one's pleasure; to act as one wants and take joy in the responsibility of planning one's life for oneself autonomously. When one asks oneself why everything is so *fucked* – it is because they have misunderstood their condition, fled in the face of death into the tranquilizing arms of *das Man*. When everything sits broken, alienated, foreign and startling, the solution is not to run – rather to face the challenge head on and do as one will in the situation that is disclosed, to have an *amour fati* and have a light-heart. One had no choice to be born, but one exists and must do something with this. Why should not one burn themselves out with a free cheer in a blaze of joy – the colours of these explosions paint a much more vibrant reality than the grey boredom of the domination of *das Man*.

§4 – *Endsieg der Nihilismus oder Tanz der das 'Tromars'?*

When one looks out at the pallid existence of modernity it appears as if most have already given up looking for themselves and justify the point of their existence and their ontological and metaphysical views on that which they believe others believe – they base their views on the nullity of an imagined other, on nothingness itself – on an other that is not something a subject can manifest concretely. However, I would argue that there is certain type of joy that is necessary for the general psychologic *Dasein*, the entity which we are all ourselves. This nature of this joy however, cannot be fleshed out via linguistics, and at best requires further investigation. Nevertheless, I hope to have disclosed it's existence through my exposition of an existential psychoanalytical reading of the Hiedggerian existential analysis of Dasein and the notion of the dictatorship of *das Man*, anxiety, the call of conscience, and authenticity. There is much further work to be done, yet if one understands the aforementioned Heideggerian framework, one will understand how easy it is to accept tranquility; in the same vein it also becomes easier to understand and help oneself live out one's own death. Indeed, is it really that radical of an idea that we as *Dasein* can take care of each other in such a way that we can help foster joy through individual authenticity? Perhaps a yes to days that are worth living and a no to waking up wishing to be dead – a straight line. This life in in decay, but for us dear reader, there is still life to be lived.

The door stands open -

*Across lines, invisible hands are held, golden streamers building in the night.
Alone, the possibilities are enormous.
Step outside and parasites, deprived of their meat, wait to suck on tiring flesh,
Unending statistics that fatten leaders, prisoners of their morality.
Afraid of death, we can not save ourselves.aa
To breathe is not enough (Crass).*

Works Cited

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